Merger of now, it was possible for a

Merger of a term and a representation
Section 50 of the CRA 2015 is one of the new provisions that have been introduced, which stipulates that pre and post contractual representation made by the trader about service provisions is to be treated as an implied term of the contract, given that the consumer has relied on the representation in making their decision about the services.
The issue here is that terms and representations are two distinct concepts and might cause some litigation on the matter. The Act’s Explanatory Notes justifies the insertion of this particular section, that is to prevent service providers from making inflated claims about the service provisions they can offer and to safeguard the enforceability of parts of the 2013 Regulations (a further reference to them).
Hence, a consumer can claim a breach of contract with the condition that he or she shows that they have relied on the representation when making any decision about the service. Nevertheless, blurring the lines between a term and a representation by making a representation a term does no more than generating uncertainty. As of now, it was possible for a consumer to demonstrate that a statement was both a representation and term. However, the implementation of this section suggests that it is now only a term. For instance, contingent upon the importance of the statement to the consumer by the trader, a representation could amount to a term, as held in Bannerman v White. Therefore, it is questionable whether it is required that the consumer show that there was a representation or that the representation amounted to a term.
Furthermore, it appears that this section requires two things, that there be ‘a representation’ and the consumer must ‘take into account’ that representation in making the decision about the service. This implies the assessment of a dual objective/subjective test. First of all, a representation would assemble the objective assessment. This is covered by the common law, which states that for a representation to become a contractual term depends on whether the individual making the representation (the trader) should bear contractual responsibility rather than whether they have agreed, as held in Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton. The issue of whether contractual responsibility should be borne by an individual seems to be a value judgment contingent upon matters such as the relative importance the consumer placed on the statement made, and any special knowledge the service provider had, as held in Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd; Chess Ltd v Williams.
It is still open to doubt whether the consumer will need to demonstrate that the service provider should bear contractual responsibility. Alternatively, the consumer will need to argue the standards for a misrepresentation, which are innocent, fraudulent, negligent, or statutory. For the most part, this necessitates a statement of fact to be made to the claimant and upon which they have acted upon.
The subjective assessment involves showing that the claimant took into account the representation made by the service provider and relied upon that representation in making any decision about the service. The threshold is set at a fairly low level with regard to inducement under common law. The claimant simply has to manifest that it was one of the reasons they entered into the contract.